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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID CARL REED, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20050670-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
attempted child kidnaping, a first degree felony (R. 203-05). 
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to the 
pourover provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-
3(2) (j) (West 2004) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was the evidence that defendant, who first attempted to 
expose himself to a 12-year-old girl and, a few minutes later, 
opened the back door of his vehicle and ordered her to get in, 
sufficient to support a conviction for attempted child kidnaping? 
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be 
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that "reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1), governing child kidnaping, 
provides: 
(1) An actor commits child kidnaping if the 
actor intentionally or knowingly, without 
authority of law, and by any means and in any 
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports a child under the age of 14 
without the consent of the victim's parent or 
guardian, or the consent of a person acting 
in loco parentis. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(West 2004), defining attempt, 
provides in pertinent part: 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
crime; and 
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result 
is an element of the crime, he acts with an 
awareness that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
constitutes a substantial step if it strongly 
corroborates the actor's mental state as 
defined in Subsection (1)(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of attempted child 
kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-301.1 (R. 1-3). A jury convicted him as charged (R. 203-
2 
05). The court sentenced him to three-years-to-life in the Utah 
State Prison, with credit for time served; ordered him to pay 
$500 plus interest to a sentence trust; and ordered restitution, 
if necessary, for victim counseling (id.). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The 12-year-old female victim was walking her dog west in a 
residential area on 500 South in Salt Lake when defendant pulled 
up on the opposite side of the street, across from a "tot lot" 
park, and stopped his car (R. 226: 24, 33, 76, 102-103). Both 
the victim and defendant agree about what happened next. 
Defendant described the encounter: "I planned on exposing myself 
to her. I got in a position in the car to where my belt line was 
above the door, and I said, AHey' . . . I had my hand on my belt 
and the tip of the zipper between my fingers, that was it." (Id. 
at 104; accord id. at 24-25, 33) . 
The victim "got scared," looked away from defendant, and 
"kept walking" west on 500 South towards the intersection with 
1000 West (Id. at 25-26, 77). Defendant then made a u-turn, 
drove past the victim on the same side of the street, and stopped 
at the stop sign on the corner of 500 South and 1000 West (Id. at 
36-37, 77, 81-82). As the girl approached, defendant reached 
over the front seat and "just opened the back - the right-back 
door, and he yelled, 'Get in'" in "a demanding way" (Id. at 26, 
28). Scared, the victim "ran across the street and ran into the 
alley. . . trying to run back home" (Id. at 28). 
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A neighbor, newly home from work and enjoying a cup of 
coffee on his front porch across the street from the park, saw 
defendant pull up directly in front of his house to talk to the 
girl (Id. at 76). He testified, "She kept shaking her head, no. 
That's what got my attention. She kept shaking her head, no. I 
knew something was going on" (Id. at 80). The neighbor watched 
defendant as he made a U-turn and drove past the girl to the stop 
sign. He testified: 
[Defendant s]topped right there in front of 
the stop sign on the right side of the 
street. The little girl was walking up. She 
got to where that stop sign was that says you 
got to stop at the next stop sign. . . and 
she got up to right there, and the next thing 
you know, she runs across the street. The 
guy in the car turned and turned the corner. 
He almost wiped out another car when he was 
turning the corner to take off. 
Id. at 77. Explaining further, the neighbor stated that 
defendant make a left turn at the stop sign, "booking it," 
clearly in a hurry. Id. at 78, 82. 
After the girl crossed the street, she and her dog entered 
the alley, where she saw a vehicle at the other end (Id. 29, 40). 
Fearing it might be defendant again, she reversed directions and 
ran to a house on the corner of the alley and 500 South 
"[b]ecause I know the people that live there" (Id. at 29-30). 
The grandmother of the girl's friend responded to her "pounding 
on the door" (Id. at 48). The grandmother testified that the 
girl was crying, shaking, and hysterical and said "that there was 
a man in a brown car trying to get her into the car" (Id. at 49). 
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More specifically, the girl told her that the man pulled over, 
opened the back passenger door of his car, and told her to get in 
(Id. at 49-50, 54). The grandmother called the police (Id. at 
52). As the two were waiting on the front porch for the police 
to arrive, the girl said, "There goes the car/7 and the 
grandmother looked up to see "just a flash" of "an old brown 
four-door . . . an Oldsmobile or something like that" as it drove 
out of sight (Id.). 
Based on the information the girl gave the police, defendant 
was soon apprehended. An officer drove the girl to a nearby 
location, where she identified defendant, who was standing 
outside on the grass, as the man who had accosted her (Id. at 87-
88) . 
At trial, defendant testified that when the police 
interviewed him later that day, he only gradually conceded what 
he had done (IcL at 62-64, 109-10; see also R. 202). He admitted 
that he had planned to expose himself to the victim to get a 
"rush" or a "thrill" (IcL_ at 106-07, 111, 119). He also admitted 
that the girl ignored him the first time, thus denying him the 
rush he was seeking (Id. at 119). He repeatedly denied that when 
he stopped at the stop sign, he either opened the car door or 
ordered the girl to get into the car (Id. at 64-65, 68-69, 108, 
114; see also R. 202: 9, 25, 43). 
After hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted defendant 
as charged (R. 179). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction for attempted child kidnaping. This 
contention turns on the credibility of the witnesses. Here, the 
jury apparently believed the victim when she testified that 
defendant first accosted her at the tot lot and then subsequently 
both opened the car door and demanded that she get in. The jury 
may also have believed that defendant circled around to the alley 
and was awaiting the victim at the other end when she ran down 
the alley. The jury also believed that the testimony of the 
neighbor and the grandmother corroborated the girl's version of 
the events. Where credibility determinations are within the 
province of the jury and the appellate court does not revisit 
them, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for 
attempted child kidnaping. 
ARGUMENT 
WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT, 
WITH DEFERENCE TO THE JURY'S 
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS, THE 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT OPENED HIS 
CAR DOOR AND ORDERED THE GIRL TO 
GET IN SUFFICES TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR 
ATTEMPTED CHILD KIDNAPING 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he engaged in conduct constituting a substantial 
step towards kidnaping the 12-year-old victim. See Br. of Aplt. 
at 17-18. Defendant's argument has two prongs. First, he 
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contends that "[i]t is questionable whether [defendant] actually 
opened the car door and said, AGet in,' as [the victim] claimed" 
(Id. at 20). And second, even if defendant did say and do as the 
victim asserted, he argues that his conduct did not amount to the 
"substantial step" required to convict on attempted child 
kidnaping because "it is not reasonable to conclude that this 
conduct strongly corroborated that [defendant] intentionally or 
knowingly acted to commit child kidnaping" (Id. at 21). 
The trial court considered these arguments at the end of the 
state's case, when defendant moved to dismiss for failure to make 
a prima facie case. In denying defendant's motion, the court 
first acknowledged that it was within the province of the jury to 
reconcile any inconsistencies in the testimony. See R. 226: 96. 
The court then ruled: 
There being a child involved in this, I think 
that if I look at the testimony in the light 
most favorable to the State for purpose of 
dismissal, I think they have established a 
prima facie case. 
The evidence I have is that [defendant] 
opened the door and in a demanding voice 
ordered [the girl] to get in the car. If she 
had gotten in the car, even for an instant, 
that probably would have been a kidnaping. I 
think [the State] made a substantial - at 
least for the purpose of a prima facie case, 
the opening of the door, and he demanding 
that she get in is a substantial step towards 
the possibility of detaining her against her 
will or without any authority, so I'm going 
to deny your motion. I think that they have 
established a prima facie case. 
Id. at 97-98. 
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This ruling is correct. In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence following a criminal conviction, this Court's role is 
limited. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). A 
reviewing court will reverse a criminal conviction on 
insufficiency grounds only when the evidence is so lacking that 
"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that 
defendant committed the crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983) , superseded on other grounds, State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). However, "[w]here there is any 
evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can be 
made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we 
will sustain the verdict." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989). 
In this case, defendant's insufficiency argument turns on 
two contentions. First, he asserts that the truth of the 
victim's statement that defendant opened the car door and ordered 
her to get in is "questionable" because her testimony as a whole 
suffered from imprecision and from inconsistencies with the 
testimony of other witnesses (Br. of Aplt. at 20-21). As a 
pivotal inconsistency, defendant cites to the testimony of the 
neighbor in front of whose home defendant originally stopped, 
asserting that it "directly contradicted" the victim's testimony 
about defendant's opening the car door and ordering her to get in 
(Id. at 21). The neighbor's testimony, however, did not 
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contradict the victim's. The neighbor testified only that he did 
not see defendant either turn around in the car or open the car 
door (R. 226: 83-84). He did not assert that these things never 
happened. And, indeed, from his vantage point, half a block away 
on the opposite side of the street, with defendant's passenger 
door beyond his purview, his testimony is easily squared with 
that of the victim. Moreover, all other testimony of the victim 
that defendant cites as imprecise or inconsistent can only be 
characterized as inconsequential, such as the color and style of 
defendant's hair (about which the victim never expressed any 
surety); details about the car; and where the victim stood while 
her friend's grandmother called the police (a matter clearly 
explained by the grandmother). See Br. of Aplt. at 20. 
In any event, defendant's argument fails because defendant 
ignores the role of credibility in the jury's assessment of the 
evidence. The law is well-settled that "determinations of 
witness credibility are left to the jury. The jury is free to 
believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony." 
State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)(citing State 
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App. 1990). 
When the evidence presented is conflicting or 
disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive 
judge of both the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be given particular 
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may 
not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. 
9 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)(citations 
omitted). Furthermore, minor inconsistencies or contradictions 
in a witness's testimony will not warrant reversal based on 
insufficient evidence. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
As a secondary argument, defendant contends that even if he 
opened the car door and ordered the 12-year-old girl to get in, 
that conduct did not amount to an attempted child kidnaping 
because it did not constitute a "substantial step toward 
commission of the crime." Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(2). 
"In order for conduct to constitute a substantial step, 
there must be more than mere preparation." State v. Johnson, 821 
P.2d 1150, 1157 (Utah 1991). Further, the conduct must "strongly 
corroborate[]" the defendant's intent to commit the underlying 
crime. Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(2). The Model Penal Code, whose 
definition resembles Utah's attempt statute, lists as an example 
of conduct that constitutes a substantial step: 
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following 
the contemplated victim of the crime; . . . 
Model Penal Code §5.01 (2) (2002) . See also State v. Casey, 2003 
UT 55, 1 26, 82 P.3d 1106 (noting that while Utah's attempt 
statute is based on the Model Penal Code, "in contradiction to 
the M.P.C., [Utah's statute] requires intentional conduct"). 
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, defendant's actions, both by 
word and deed, strongly corroborated his intent to kidnap the 
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girl. Specifically, he pulled up across the street from her and 
verbally accosted her, while lifting himself up and fiddling with 
his zipper (R. 226: 24-25, 33, 104). When she turned her back on 
him, he made a u-turn, followed her, passed her, and stopped on 
the same side of the road, a bit ahead of her (Id. at 36-37, 77, 
81-82). Furthermore, when the girl approached, defendant opened 
his car door and demanded that she get in (Id. at 26, 28). When 
she ran across the street away from him, he turned left, and the 
girl then thought she saw his car at the other end of the alley 
she ran into, trying to escape (Id. at 29-30, 40). Taken as a 
whole, defendant's actions fall within the ambit of "searching 
for or following the contemplated victim of the crime," one of 
several kinds of conduct constituting a "substantial step" 
towards commission of the crime. 
Defendant's arguments that his true intent was to frighten 
the girl into running away, "thereby giving him the thrill he was 
seeking" and that it was unlikely that a pre-teen walking a large 
dog would get in the car, are unavailing (Id. at 22-23). The 
fatal flaw in defendant's insufficiency argument is his 
presumption "that the jury was obligated to believe the evidence 
most favorable to defendant rather than that presented in 
opposition by the State." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 
1982). When the evidence is viewed as it must be on appeal — in 
the light most favorable to the verdict — it is plainly 
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sufficient to support a conviction for attempted child kidnaping. 
Defendant's claim, therefore, fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of attempted child kidnaping, a first 
degree felony. 
/— 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 / day of January, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
rflftUi^C^. 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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